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Effects of Foreign Acquisitions on Financial constraints, Productivity and Investment in 
R&D of Target Firms in China 
by 
Yuhuilin Chen, Xiuping Hua & Agyenim Boateng 
Abstract 
This paper examines whether foreign acquisitions lessen financial constraints, improve 
investment in research & development (R&D) and productivity of the target firms in China 
based on a sample of 914 cross-border mergers and acquisitions (CBM&A) over the period of 
1994-2011. Using investment to cash-flow sensitivity to measure financial constraints, we find 
that foreign acquisitions in China are associated with a reduction of target firms’ financial 
constraints, irrespective of the ownership type of the target firm. However, the extent of 
financial constraint reduction is pronounced for non-SOEs compared to state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs). This study also provides evidence that foreign acquisitions improve 
Chinese target firms’ productivity and investment in R&D. 
 






The economic and institutional reforms in the emerging countries, particularly, Brazil, Russia, 
India and China (BRIC), are widely seen as pivotal in attracting foreign direct investment 
(FDI) inflows into these countries. FDI inflows into BRIC which stood at 4,712.6 million US 
dollars in 1990 increased to 285,325.2 million US dollars in 2013 (UNCTAD, 2015). In 
similar vein, cross border mergers and acquisitions (CBM&A)
1
 which constitute a dominant 
share of FDI and a popular strategy for penetrating into foreign markets are on the rise (Du 
and Boateng, 2015). According to the UNCTAD (2015), CBM&A inflows into China 
increased from 1,340 million US dollars in 1990 to 50,148 million US dollars in 2013, being 
the highest among the BRIC countries. It is argued that cross-border investment inflows do 
not only bring in the private and needed capital but have implications for productivity and 
investment in research & development (R&D) of the host country firms (Miozzo et al., 2016; 
Harrison et al., 2004; Harrison and McMillan, 2003). This is especially important for 
emerging country firms which typically face financial constraints that curtail their ability to 
undertake value enhancing projects, invest in R&D, and to upgrade existing facilities to 
enhance productivity (see Almeida et al., 2004).  
                                                     
1
 We define CBM&A in this study as a takeover of assets and liabilities of Chinese target by a foreign company 
or a foreign company and Chinese company come together to merge. Following UNCTAD (2000), we place 
emphasis on the transfer of control of assets and operations from a local firm to a foreign firm, with the former 
becoming an affiliate of the later or two companies with different nationalities coming together with the foreign 
company exercising some control over operations and decision making. 
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While recent studies have examined whether acquisitions can potentially mitigate financial 
constraints of target firms and increase the number of investments (see Almeida et al., 2011; 
Khatami et al., 2015; Erel et al., 2015) in the context of developed countries, relatively little 
evidence exists in emerging countries (Cull et al., 2015). The few studies that examine the 
financial constraints in emerging countries focus on domestic firms with no study on the 
effects of foreign acquisitions on financial constraints, R&D and productivity of target firms.  
However, Peng (2008) and Antal-Mokos (1998) indicate that acquisitions are, particularly, 
sensitive to the efficiency of the financial markets and the market for corporate control. 
Acquisition transactions greatly rely on institutional framework that ensures transparency, 
certainty, and contract enforcement (Peng and Heath, 1996). Yet institutions (formal and 
informal), market for corporate control and corporate governance systems in emerging 
countries are weak compared to developed countries (Xu, 2011; Du and Boateng, 2015). Lin 
et al. (2009) argue that the weakness of institutions in emerging countries may lead to smaller, 
more volatile, and less liquid markets, which reduces the potential for acquisitions. More 
importantly, Xu (2011); Guler and Guillen (2010) point out that, for technology spillover to 
occur, a set of institutions should be in place to facilitate access to resources, technology and 
improve productivity. For example, contract law and private property rights enforcement 
protect the interests of acquiring firms and reduce the risk of dissipation of technology in the 
host country and are important for investment in technology (Xu, 2004). Unfortunately, 
institutions in emerging countries are weak with many firms controlled by dominant 
shareholder often the state thereby exacerbating agency problems. 
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The above is against the backdrop that studies examining FDI spillovers via technology 
transfer and productivity of which CBM&A is a dominant part have produced mixed results 
(see Sinani and Meyer, 2004; Betrand, 2009; Miozzo et al., 2016). While it is argued that 
acquisitions may lessen the target firms’ financial constraints and increase investment in R&D 
and productivity, policy makers have raised concerns about the beneficial effects of 
acquisitions to the target firms (Miozzo et al., 2016; Bertrand, 2009). For example, the 
Chairman of the Welcome Trust indicated that past acquisitions of Pfizer of USA have mostly 
led to a substantial reduction in R&D activity of target firms (Financial Times, 8 May 2014). 
Indeed, the effects of foreign acquisitions on financial constraints of the target firms and the 
extent to which acquisitions can alleviate financial constraints and improve R&D activity and 
productivity of target firms have not been systematically examined in the emerging country 
environment where institutions are weak.  
In this paper, we investigate whether foreign acquisitions lessen financial constraints, and 
improve productivity and investment in R&D of the target firms in emerging countries. We 
use a sample of 914 inward CBM&A in China which occurred over the 1994 - 2011 period to 
analyse whether Chinese firms have financial constraints before being acquired, and to what 
extent do foreign acquisitions mitigate financial constraints and enhance investment in R&D 
and productivity of target firms in the post-acquisition period.  
The choice of China for an empirical examination of financial constraints is based on the 
following reasons: First, China is a major player in the global market for corporate control 
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and attracts over 45 and 50 percent of the volume and value of acquisition activities by 
foreign firms occurring in BRIC countries (UNCTAD, 2015). Despite this, the past empirical 
efforts have paid no attention to foreign acquisitions in China, perhaps due to paucity of data. 
CBM&A research in the context of China has focused exclusively on acquiring firms (see 
Boateng et al., 2008; Rui and Yip, 2008; Du and Boateng, 2015). With the availability of data 
in respect of target firms, this study provides us with rare opportunity to analyse the effects of 
foreign acquisitions of Chinese targets on financial constraints, investment in R&D and 
productivity.  
Second, Chinese firms like their counterparts in other BRIC countries are faced with financial 
constraints (Hericourt and Poncet, 2009; Cull et al., 2015). However, financial constraints 
faced by Chinese firms have several dimensions and may differ from that found in developed 
markets. Financial constraints in China appear to be driven by both market and non-market 
factors such as central and local government ownership of firms with associated interferences 
which distort credit allocation in China (Poncet et al., 2010; Cull et al., 2015). Many of the 
resources and organisation structures of local firms are built around nonmarket forms of 
transactions thereby making it harder for acquirers to evaluate properly target firms for 
post-acquisition restructuring with far-reaching implications for productivity (Tong et al., 
2008). Institutions in China are not only weak but also the government is deeply involved in 
business through ownership and control of firms in both financial and non-financial sectors 
(Du and Boateng, 2015; Hitt et al., 2004). Consequently, instead of government protecting 
private property rights and enforcing contracts by separating itself from businesses, there is no 
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clear separation between Chinese government and businesses (Xu, 2011). The above has 
implications for firm investment strategies and productivity because host country institutions 
affect foreign firms’ organisational capabilities to transfer technology, access external 
resources and take risks in the host country (Guler and Guillen, 2010). Although, over the past 
two decades, China has reformed its enterprises through privatisation and reduce restrictions 
in the banking sector, Boateng, Huang and Kufuor (2015) suggest that problems still remain 
in the banking sector. The above considerations motivate the choice of China for this study. 
The results of this study indicate that foreign acquisitions in China are associated with a 
reduction of target firms’ financial constraints, irrespective of the ownership type of the target 
firm. However, the extent of constraint reduction is pronounced for non-SOEs (i.e. domestic 
and foreign private-owned enterprises) compared to state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Our 
results also suggest that the foreign acquisitions increase productivity and investment in R&D 
of the target firms. The study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, we 
contribute to the large body of literature on capital market imperfections and firm investment 
in emerging country context where massive institutional reforms have taken place over the 
past two decades. In particular, we shed lights on financial constraints and how ownership 
type of banks in emerging markets affect efficient allocation of capital in formal financing 
sector. This is significant in that the ability of Chinese financial system to allocate capital 
more efficiently and guarantee fair access to finance for all companies is a key yardstick for 
measuring the success of the reforms carried out so far. Second, obtaining technological 
know-how and developing technical capabilities are increasingly important for sustainable 
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economic growth in emerging economies. Acquisitions (market for firms) are an important 
part of business process of redeploying resources into more productive uses compared to the 
market for some resources (Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000). By examining the effects of 
acquisitions on target resources (financial constraints), investment in R&D and productivity, 
we provide evidence on efficiency gains derived from foreign acquisitions in an environment 
where institutions are weak.   
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the literature on 
the effects of foreign acquisitions on the target financial constraints, productivity, R&D 
investments and develops the research hypotheses of the study. Section 3 presents the sample 
selection as well as the analytical method used in this study followed by the discussion of the 
results. The final section concludes the paper and discusses the implications of the study. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Theoretical background and financial constraints 
The neoclassical models of investment assume that capital markets are perfect (Modigliani 
and Miller, 1958). However, the assumption of perfect market is inconsistent with what 
happens in the real world where the cost of internal and external finance diverge (Laeven. 
2003). Carpenter and Petersen (2002), Laeven (2003), Poncet et al. (2010) and Cull et al. 
(2015) point out that the financial constraints stem predominantly from capital market 
imperfections such as information asymmetry, weak institutions and corporate governance 
systems. In this regard, a firm’s investment decisions reflect both market and non-market 
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imperfections in that market (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002). However, prior studies such as 
Sufi (2009) and Erel et al. (2015) have utilised capital market theory as dominant explanation 
for firms’ financial constraints and ignored the role of host government and institutions.  
 
In this study, we employ capital market theory in addition to institutional theory because 
government influences are stronger in emerging economies than in developed countries 
(Hoskisson et al., 2000). We argue that the role of government and host country institutions 
are important in explaining financial constraints, investment in R&D and productivity. 
Institutions defined as “the rules of the game” influence the strategies, structures, and 
competitiveness of firms (North, 1990). Guler and Gullen (2010) and Meyer and Sinani (2009) 
express similar view and indicate that host country institutions affect multinational enterprises’ 
(MNEs) organisational capabilities to access external resources, strategies and their ability to 
take risks in a host country. Foreign acquiring firms often encounter unfamiliarity and 
discriminatory costs associated with their foreign operations (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). 
We expect such costs to be low if a host country has implemented a set of 
investment-supporting institutions, such as property rights regulations with strong legal 
enforcement regime which constrain expropriation of firms’ strategic assets, and facilitate 
market transactions (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Acemoglu et al., 2003).  
 
On the other hand, under-developed institutions generate hazard of expropriation, operational 
risks and transactional uncertainty thereby hampering technological spillover and 
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consequently productivity (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Estrin and Prevezer, 2011). In 
emerging countries, institutions are weak and corporate governance systems are characterised 
by ownership concentrated in the hands of the central and local governments (Ayyagari et al., 
2012; Cull et al., 2015). The concentrated ownership in the hands of the state leads to 
potential agency problems and the effects depend on the way the key institutions work in the 
country in question (Estrin and Prevezer, 2011).  
 
2.2 Effects of Foreign Acquisitions on Target R&D and Productivity 
A number of researchers have documented that foreign direct investors play an important role 
in alleviating financial constraints by bringing scarce capital into the host country firms 
(Harrison et al., 2004; Héricourt and Poncet 2009; Erel et al., 2015; Khatami et al., 2015). If 
acquisitions indeed ease financial constraints of the target firms, then the intriguing question 
that follows is that, do the acquisitions lead to an increase in investment in R&D and improve 
productivity of the relieved firms? This is an important question because researchers have 
raised concerns about whether acquisitions benefit the target firms in terms of R&D and 
productivity improvements (Miozzo et al., 2016; Bertrand, 2009). The results thus far 
regarding the target’s productivity, investment in R&D appear mixed (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; 
Roller et al., 2001; Nocke and Yeaple, 2008). On one hand, Cassiman et al. (2005) argue that 
CBM&A increase the potential to generate scale and scope economies in R&D, thereby 
enhancing R&D investment and productivity. Supporting this line of thinking, Hagedoorn and 
Duysters (2002); Bwalya (2006); Bertrand (2009); Stiebale and Reize, (2011); Cull et al. 
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(2015) contend that FDI via acquisitions are associated with increased investment in R&D 
and improvement in productivity of the target firms. Overall, the above studies suggest that 
acquisitions affect both innovative inputs and outputs (Hit et al., 1991). Prominent among the 
factors that facilitate technology spillover and improve productivity include the quality of 
human capital that shape a firm’s ability to adapt new ideas and techniques (Agarwal et al., 
2014). Siegel and Simons (2010) therefore argue that high quality management can help 
implement technological and organisational change thereby increasing productivity. Jovanic 
and Rousseau (2008); Holmes and Schmitz (1990) found some support for the relationship 
between the quality of management and post-acquisition productivity. Others such as Cohen 
et al. (1990); Agarwal et al. (2014); Vaara et al. (2012) contend that that target firm’s ability to 
assimilate new ideas depends on their absorptive capacity, host country features and culture.  
 
On the other hand, some researchers argue that CBM&A can also lead to a reduction in R&D 
investment and productivity because of reduced competition and reorganisation of business 
units which tend to disrupt established routines of the acquiring firm and those of the target 
firms (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Ranft and Lord, 2002; 
Puranam et al., 2006). Another strand of literature also points out that acquisitions may lead to 
the innovation activity of target firms being reduced and shifted away, thereby depriving the 
local economy of strategic technology and technological spillovers (UNCTAD, 2005). This 
study therefore sheds lights on whether acquisitions relieve financial constraints and facilitate 
the financing of R&D and improve productivity.  
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2.4 Acquisitions and Financial Constraints 
Prior studies have documented that the governments in developing countries play a bigger 
role in the allocation of financial resources and channel a large share of capital to state owned 
enterprises (SOEs) (Ayyagari et al., 2012; Cull et al. 2015). The intervention of government in 
capital allocation in developing countries leads to financial frictions. Consequently, Laeven 
(2003) asserts that firms in these markets face high financial frictions which lead to financial 
constraints. Harrison et al. (2004); Aghion et al. (1999) support this view and point out that 
financial constraints are likely to be more severe in developing countries compared to 
developed countries because of pervasive government intervention that tend to crowd out a 
large proportion of firms from external financing from the state owned banks. A number of 
studies such as Poncet et al. (2010); Hericourt and Poncet (2009); Cull et al. (2015); Ayyagari 
et al. (2010) have rendered some support and indicated that firms in developing countries face 
financial constraints due to poor access to finance. We expect Chinese target firms to financial 
constraints consistent to the above findings. We therefore hypothesise that: 
Hypothesis 1a: Chinese target firms are faced with financial constraints prior to acquisitions.  
In addition to the above argument, La Porta et al. (2002); Sapienza (2004) document that, 
state ownership of firms in both financial and non-financial sectors is one of the important 
features of developing countries. However, state ownership of firms can generate corruption, 
misallocation of resources and financial constraints (Banerjee, 1997; Sapienza, 2004; Stein, 
2003). This is consistent with the view that agency problems directly influence the allocation 
process of financial resources to the firms (Poncet et al., 2010).  
 12 
 
In the context of emerging economies, due to the weaknesses in institutions and corporate 
governance systems, the distorting effects of government ownership on firm’s financing 
decisions appear more pronounced (Behr et al., 2013). For example, Cull et al. (2015) and 
Poncet et al. (2010) found that credit allocation in China is driven by government intervention 
through state-owned banks which give preferential treatment to SOEs compared to non-SOEs. 
However, these studies were based on 2005 data and it is pertinent to point out that more 
reforms have taken place in China over the last 10 years. We expect the massive financial 
reforms/liberalisation undertaken in China over the last decade to reduce financial constraints. 
This because it is argued that reforms reduce financial frictions by improving in corporate 
governance system and scaling down of government directed-credit programme (see Laeven, 
2003). We therefore hypothesise that: 
Hypothesis 1b: The financial constraints of non-SOEs will not vary from SOEs in China. 
 
Recent studies in the context of developed countries document that M&A has an effect on 
target firm’s financial constraints after acquisition. It is argued that being part of a larger 
organisation following an acquisition can improve financing through better access to the 
capital markets, and also the possibility of a reallocation of capital across divisions (Stein, 
2003). For example, Erel et al. (2015) examined 5,187 European acquisitions which occurred 
from 2001 through 2008 and reported that, subsequent to an acquisition, the level of target 
cash holdings, the sensitivity of cash holdings to cash flow, and the sensitivity of investment 
to cash flow declined, while the quantity of targets’ investments increased after the acquisition. 
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Using a sample of US acquisitions, Khatami et al. (2015) rendered some support to the view 
acquisitions improve financially constrained firms’ ability to access capital through a better 
re-allocation of resources.  
In the context of developing countries, prior studies such as Hericourt and Poncet (2009); 
Harrison and McMillan (2003); Boateng and Glaister (1999) found that foreign investment 
inflows bring in the needed capital and other resources to these countries. Hericourt and 
Poncet (2009) point out that because of Chinese government interference in the allocation of 
capital to achieve social and political objectives, capital mobility within China appears low. 
Huang (2003) therefore argued that foreign investors provide a viable alternative of equity 
capital to alleviate financial constraints and facilitate firm growth. In the light of the above 
argument, we expect CBM&A to bring in capital funds following the purchase by foreign 
acquirers thereby alleviating domestic firms’ financial constraints. Consequently, we put 
forward the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Foreign acquisitions will alleviate Chinese target firms’ financial constraints. 
 
2.4 Alleviation of Financial Constraints; R&D and Productivity 
Global capital flows are associated with a reduction in firm-level financing constraints 
(Harrison et al., 2004) which may facilitate greater internal financing for R&D (Hall, 2002). 
However, prior literature indicates that the relationship between foreign acquisitions and an 
increase in R&D investment appears mixed (Stiebale and Reize, 2011). On one hand, it is 
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argued that M&A can lead to reduction in R&D because of reduced competition. In particular, 
research evidence (e.g., Kumar, 2001; UNCTAD, 2005) suggests that there is a danger that 
acquiring firms may centralise R&D in their home country to avoid the costs of coordinating 
dispersed R&D centres. Consequently, innovative activity of the target firm could be reduced 
or shifted away, thereby reducing the potential of R&D as a source of innovation and 
technological spillover in host country. Hitt et al. (1991) have rendered some support to the 
conclusion that M&A decrease R&D investment.  
 
On the other hand, Cassiman et al. (2005) contend that CBM&A enable scale and scope 
economies in R&D efforts and facilitate reorganisation of the combined firms’ R&D efforts. 
For example, Larsson and Finkelstein (1999) note that CBM&A enable access to a wider set 
of resources residing in different country boundaries. Vaara et al. (2012) found evidence that 
CBM&A are positively associated with R&D. Similarly, Bertrand (2009) found that 
acquisitions of French firms and firms in OECD countries by foreign acquirers increase R&D 
spending of the target firms. In acquiring China Biopharmaceuticals (CHBP), NeoStem, a 
US-based developer of stem cell therapies indicated that the acquisition would enable the 
combined entity to collaborate and increase R&D efforts in China (Industry Watch, 2009, 
p.27). This supports the contention that foreign acquisitions tend to increase investment in 
R&D in host countries. Girma et al. (2015) point out that to accelerate the pace of 
technological advancement from abroad, the Chinese government gives a number of 
incentives to foreign firms engaged in innovative acquisitions and this has led to increase in 
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R&D activities in China. We expect that foreign acquisitions should have positive impact on 
R&D budgets and this lead to our third hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3: Foreign acquisitions will increase R&D investments of Chinese target firms. 
 
Prior literature documents that financial constraints impact on firm’s productivity. It is argued 
that financial constrained firms in emerging countries lack the capacity and are unable to 
make investments essential for firm growth and increase productivity (Ayyagari et al., 2010). 
Agarwal et al. (2014) found that lack of access to sources of external finance represents a 
major obstacle to the absorption of productivity spillovers originating from foreign firms in 
China. However, this study focused on productivity spillovers arising from the operation of 
foreign owned firms rather than foreign acquisitions. We argue that foreign acquisitions can 
potentially mitigate such constraints and enable the acquirer to exploit its ownership 
advantages in foreign markets as posited by the eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 1977; 1981). 
Thus the possession of ownership advantages by foreign acquiring firms (intangible and 
tangible resources) acts as a source of innovation for target firms and has implications for 
target firms’ productivity. Theoretically, as multinational firms possess these firm-specific 
assets which can be transferred to the acquired firms abroad, the technology spillover is 
expected to raise efficiency and productivity of target firms (Bwalya, 2006). Conyon et al. 
(2002); Bertrand and Zuniga (2006) found that acquisitions to have positive and significant 
effect on productivity in the UK and OECD countries respectively. We therefore expect that 
acquisitions in China will lead to productivity gains. 
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Hypothesis 4: Foreign acquisitions improve Chinese target firms’ productivity. 
 
3. Data and measurements 
3.1 Data 
To investigate the effects of foreign acquisitions on Chinese target firms, we use a sample of 
foreign acquisitions that occurred in China during the period of 1994 - 2011. The data relating 
to acquiring and target firms were derived from the Chinese Stock Market & Accounting 
Research database (CSMAR) and Wind Merger & Acquisition databases. Macroeconomic 
data was collected from the World Bank database. CSMAR and Wind Merger & Acquisition 
databases include domestic and CBM&A cases. These databases provide information of the 
CBM&A transactions such as deal status, dates of announcement and deal completion dates. 
To be included in the sample, we restrict the sample to acquisitions of Chinese target firms by 
foreign acquirers. Acquisitions must have pre- and post-acquisition information for primary 
and control variables. The restrictions led to a usable sample of 914 CBM&A of Chinese 
target firms. We collected the primary and control variables using panel data in sample. The 
observation years of the variables for the full sample consist of three years pre- acquisition 
and three years’ post-acquisition information. The period is long enough to observe changes in 
financial constraints, investments in R&D and productivity. Table 1 provides details of the 
variables definitions and data sources of the sample used in this study.  
(Insert Table 1 here please) 
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3.2 Measuring Financial Constraints 
Prior studies indicate that financial constraints occur when financial frictions prevent firms 
from undertaking all desirable investments. While a large body of literature has been devoted 
to the identification of the level of financial constraints faced by firms, there appears to be no 
consensus on which measure is the best proxy (Khatami et al., 2015; Erel et al., 2015). 
However, Cull et al. (2015) note that countries with lower level of financial development such 
as China, the investment-cash flow sensitivity is a reasonable indicator of financial constraints. 
Consequently, we employ investment-cash flow sensitivity approach as one of the measures 
of financial constraints. Further we utilise the Whited and Wu (WW) index to determine the 
level of financial constraints faced by different firms. To check the robustness of the results, 
we also use target firms’ cash holding as a proxy of financial constraints to analyse the effects 
of foreign acquisitions on Chinese target firms. We briefly describe the proxies of financial 
constraints used in the previous literature below. 
 
Investment-cash flow sensitivity 
Introduced by Fazzari et al. (1988), investment-cash flow sensitivity as an indicator of 
financial constraints involves estimating the sensitivity of a firm’s investment to its cash flows. 
Using dividend payout, Fazzari et al. (1988) exogenously separated firms into financially 
constrained and unconstrained firms. They point out that firms paying low dividends have 
financial constraints and show high investment-cash flow sensitivity. In comparison, firms 
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paying high dividends have no financial constraints and exhibit low investment-cash flow 
sensitivity. Thus they concluded that firms with high investment-cash flow sensitivity are 
typically cash constrained. A number of studies such as Carpenter and Petersen (2002), 
Moyen (2004) Xu et al. (2013) have used the investment-cash flow sensitivity to measure the 
financial constraints of firms in both developed and developing country context. To examine a 
firm’s investment to cash flow sensitivity, we use the following specification: 
𝐼𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡 + 𝜖                   (1) 
Where I is the dependent variable of a firm’s investment expressed by gross investment to 
total assets ratio at the end of year t, CF is a firm’s cash flow expressed by cash flow to total 
assets ratio at the end of year t. The control variables contain target country level variables 
and firm level variables that vary across specifications. Since we have data in respect of three 
years of pre- and post-acquisition, a panel of firm-years are estimated in the regression. We 
controlled both industry and year effects in each model specification by adding year and 
industry dummies. The industry dummies are derived on the basis of a one-digit China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) code collected from WIND database. 
 
Whited and Wu (WW) index 
Whited and Wu (2006) constructed an index of the external finance constraints of firms using 
an investment Euler equation. As an alternative index of financial constraints, Whited and Wu 
(2006) argue that their index is considered much better way of estimating a firm’s degree of 
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financial constraints because the index is based on the characteristics associated with external 
financial constraints. Prominent among researchers who have used WW index as a 
measurement of financial constraints include Li (2011) and Gomes et al. (2006). We use the 
estimated coefficient by Whited and Wu (2006), WW index are constructed based on 
following equation: 
𝑊𝑊 = −0.091 ∗
𝐶𝐹𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑡−1
− 0.062 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 0.021 ∗
𝐿𝐷𝑡
𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑡−1
− 0.044 ∗ 𝑇𝐴𝑡 − 0.035 ∗ 𝑆𝐺𝑡 




 is cash flow 𝐶𝐹𝑡 deflated by beginning of year total assets 𝑇𝐴𝑡−1, 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 
equals value of one if the firm pays cash dividends on the year t. 
𝐿𝐷𝑡
𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑡−1
 is long term debt 
𝐿𝐷𝑡 deflated by beginning of year total current assets 𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑡−1, 𝑇𝐴𝑡 is natural logarithm of 
total assets adjusted for inflation rate,  𝑆𝐺𝑡 is firm’s sales growth, 𝐼𝑆𝐺𝑡 the firm’s 3-digit 
industry sales growth. This study uses WW indices as another measurement to identify the 
level of financial constraints. 
 
3.3 Sample Characteristics  
Table 2 reports the event sample summary over the 2004-2011 period. Panel A of Table 2 
reports the acquisitions by year. The largest share of the acquisitions (15.3%) occurred in 
2008, followed by 13.5% in 2006 and 12.0% in 2011, with 103 (11.3%) occurring in 2009. 
The lowest number of acquisition events occurred in 1994 and 1996. The ownership type of 
Chinese target firms is classified into four categories: central government SOEs, local 
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government SOEs, foreign owned firms and domestic private owned firms representing 
non-SOEs. Local government SOEs constitute the largest ownership type of the sample firms 
(35.7%), followed by domestic private owned firms (31.0%) and central government SOEs 
(25.2%). The rest represents foreign owned firms in China (8.2%). The classification enables 
us to investigate the relationship between the ownership type and financial constraints given 
that prior studies suggest that SOEs have better access to bank loans administered by the big 
five state owned banks compared to private and foreign firms. Moreover, SOEs have different 
motivations (that is, political and social objectives) rather than maximisation shareholder 
wealth. We further grouped SOEs into central government SOEs and local government SOEs 
as central government SOEs tend to be key strategic government industries, while the local 
government SOEs tend to concentrate on improving local economy (Wu et al., 2012). Panel C 
of Table 2 reports our sample distribution by industry. The table shows that our sample covers 
all major CSRC industries, with slightly more than half of M&A events clustering in the 
manufacturing sector (50.3%). This is followed by real estate (12.3%) and then the 
transportation, storage and post industry (8.3%). These top 3 industries account for about 71% 
of total M&A deals. The rest of the industries include the retail and wholesale industries 
(7.8%), financial industry (5%), information transmission, computer service and software 
industries (3.5%), power, gas and water industries (3.1%). 
.  




3.4 Summary Statistics 
Table 3 provides summary statistics of characteristics of the full sample, showing that each 
variable used in our analysis varies across firms. The mean ratio for the key variable I (gross 
investment to total assets) is 0.118, while the mean value of total assets (TA) is 9.586. The 
mean ratio of cash flow to total assets (CF) is 0.843 with a maximum value of 4.468 and 
minimum value of 0.024. The average operating leverage value is 1.375, implying that 
Chinese listed acquired firms generally have high percentages of fixed operating costs and 
lower variable costs. The average log value of expense to revenue is -0.018. There are seven 
dummy variables in analysis including one financial constraint measurement (DWW), four 
ownership types (central SOE, local SOE, foreign and private), R&D expenditure and the 
observation years after the acquisition (After). The average value of productivity is 5.953 and 
the Tobin’s Q mean value is 1.542. The average GDP growth and domestic credit are 2.971 
and 2.215 respectively.  
 (Insert Table 3 here please) 
4. Results and Discussions 
Following Buckley et al. (2007) we use OLS model to estimate the relationship between 
inward FDI and spillover effects in China based on the consideration that the 
heteroskedasticity
2
 is expected to be widespread because of differences in the size of firms 
                                                     
2
 The Breusch-Pagan test confirms the presence of heteroskedasticity and p-values are significant at 1% 
level. Consequently we used robust standard errors in regressions reported in Tables 4-10. 
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sampled together.  
4.1 Financial constraints and target firms before acquisitions 
In order to examine the existence of pre-acquisition financial constraints of Chinese target 
firms and whether these financial constraints change after the acquisition, we divide the full 
sample into pre- and post- acquisition groups. These two groups are analysed separately.  
4.1.1 Investment to cash flow Sensitivity 
Based on equation 1, we use the investment-cash flow sensitivity to measure the financial 
constraints of the target firms before acquisition. The idea behind investment-cash sensitivity 
approach is that, under frictionless capital markets, investment should be a function of the 
value of the investment opportunities and independent of the firm’s financial position (Fazzari 
et al., 1988). Consequently, if a firm is not financially constrained and has enough financial 
funds, it would undertake all value enhancing investment opportunities. However, a 
financially constrained firm would choose among value increasing investments because of 
limited cash flow availability (Fazzari et al., 1988).  
Table 4 reports the estimation of the investment to cash flow sensitivity of the target firms 
prior to foreign acquisitions. Focusing on the cash flow, the results indicate that the cash flow 
(CF) variable in all the four regression models have positive and statistically significant 
coefficients suggesting that target firms in China were financially constrained before 
acquisitions. The results are in line with the findings of Harrison et al. (2004) and Aghion et al. 
(1999) who found target firms to be financially constrained due to weak institutions and high 
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level of financial frictions which restrict access to external financing to firms in developing 
countries. Hypothesis 1a is therefore supported. Regarding the control variables, we find the 
coefficients of ownership type, Tobin’s Q (a proxy for growth opportunities) and leverage are 
statistically and positively significant in the regressions. However, the expense to revenue is 
negatively related to firm’s investment.  
 
(Insert Table 4 here please) 
 
4.1.2 Investment-cash flow sensitivity partitioned by level of financial constraints  
To observe whether a firm’s cash flow correlate with investment and whether investment-cash 
flow sensitivity vary across different levels of financial constraints, WW index is used. We 
employ the following equation to examine the different levels of financial constraints.  
𝐼𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝐶𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐹𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝐶𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡 + 𝜖             (3) 
We add measurements of financial constraints (𝐹𝐶𝑡) and interaction term (𝐶𝐹𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝐶𝑡) in 
Equation 1. Financial constraints (𝐹𝐶𝑡) is WW index. A dummy variable is created for WW 
index in regression. In estimation, the firms are partitioned into higher financial constraint 
group (𝐹𝐶𝑡=0) and lower financial constraint group (𝐹𝐶𝑡=1) by using the median value of 
WW index in the observed sample. The coefficient 𝛽3 interprets whether investment-cash 




Table 5 documents the following results. The cash flow is positively and significantly 
correlated with investment confirming our results in Table 4. We find that the coefficients 𝛽3 
of DWW*CF are negative and significantly different from zero. The interaction term of 
coefficient 𝛽3  indicates the different investment-cash flow sensitivities between more 
financially constrained firms (higher value of WW index) and less financially constrained 
firms (lower value of WW index). The theoretical explanation of investment to cash flow 
sensitivity is that the financially constrained firms tend to exhaust all their cash flow to satisfy 
capital spending on investment. Thus, these firms are more sensitive to the volatility of cash 
flow availability than high dividend paying firms caused by information asymmetries (Fazzari 
et al., 1988). The criteria to determine a firm’s sensitivity of investment to cash flow is based 
on the information on firm size, age, dividend to income ratio and accessing to capital 
markets, which can be regarded as firms’ capability on obtaining external funds in the markets 
(Guariglia, 2008). However, the WW index measuring firms’ degree of external financial 
constraints is based on indicators relating to firms’ financial statistics such as total assets and 
cash dividends. Table 5 analyses the difference in sensitivity of cash flow of investment on the 
basis of the degree of internal financial constraints faced by firms. The values of interaction 
term 𝛽3 are negative and range between -0.1115 and -0.1160, indicating that financially 
constrained (higher WW value) firms rely more on their internal cash flow when they make 
investment decisions. Firms facing higher sensitivity of investment to cash flow have a 




         (Insert Table 5 her please) 
 
The results in Table 5 report the effects of ownership types on investment cash flow 
sensitivity. Columns 1 and 2 of the table reportthe result of central and local government 
SOEs whereas private and foreign owned enterprises are reported in columns 3 and 4. The 
results show that, central government SOEs and local government SOEs have significant and 
positive coefficients, while private owned firms and foreign owned firms have negative and 
significant influence on investment-cash flow sensitivity. Hypothesis 1b is therefore not 
supported indicating that the financial constraints faced by non-SOEs are more severe 
compared to SOEs. The results that different ownership types have different effects on 
investment-cash flow sensitivity appear interesting suggesting SOEs are less financially 
constrained compared to non-SOEs. The results suggest that SOEs tend to have cash to 
undertake value-creating investment opportunities whereas foreign and private firms do not. 
The findings may be explained by the fact that SOEs in China tend to obtain favourable 
treatment in credit allocation from state-owned banks compared to non-SOEs. The results 
support the conclusion drawn by Cull et al. (2015) who reported that government ownership 
of banks has distorting effects on financial allocation of resources and that SOEs are less 
financially constrained than domestic and foreign private enterprises in China. It is important 
to point out that the results that foreign private enterprises in China are financial constrained 
appears contrary to the findings of Poncet et al. (2010) who reported that foreign firms in 
China are not financially constrained. Perhaps this finding may be explained by the financing 
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policies adopted by foreign firms not to borrow in international capital markets to manage 
currency and interest rate risks in China.  
Overall, the results imply that after two decades of reforms in the banking system and 
institutions, China has not been able to create a level playing field for SOEs and non-SOEs in 
the formal financing sector and banks appear to discriminate against the private sector in 
terms of access to credit. From theoretical perspective, financial constraints arise from 
imperfections in the market, weak institutions and poor corporate governance system. It was 
therefore expected that massive government reforms and financial liberalisation in China 
would improve institutions and reduce financial frictions by scaling down government 
directed credit thereby lowering financial constraints. However, it appears that the reforms 
have not fully achieved the above goals.  
 
4.2 Financial constraints and target firms after acquisitions 
Table 6 reports the results of whether the target firms’ constraints are alleviated after the 
foreign takeover. The results indicate that coefficients of cash flow are all negative and 
insignificant suggesting that foreign acquisitions in China generally reduce the target firms’ 
financial constraints but not significantly. The findings provide some support to prior research 
evidence in developed countries such as Erel et al. (2015) and Khatami et al. (2015) which 
indicate that foreign acquisitions lessen financial constraints. Foreign acquirers bring 
additional sources of external funds and free up scare domestic credit for firms that have been 
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crowded out of the domestic capital markets (Harrison et al. 2004). The results show that 
foreign ownership can improve Chinese target firms’ financial conditions. Our results shed 
light on the importance of foreign capital inflows as a mechanism to remedy the inefficiency 
and discrimination in Chinese capital market. Arguably, the foreign acquisitions may be a 
catalyst to reforms of financial markets in China, improve business environment and firm 
efficiency. The coefficients of control variables, namely Tobin’s Q, expense to revenue and 
ownership type are insignificant. However, leverage appears significant at 10% level in one of 
the four regression models. 
(Insert Table 6 here please) 
We carried out further analysis on whether investment-cash flow sensitivity vary across 
different degrees of financial constraints post-acquisition by adding one proxy of financial 
constraints (WW index). Table 7 shows that the coefficients for DWW*CF are insignificant 
after controlling the ownership type, leverage, expense to revenue and Tobin’s Q. The results 
suggest that there are no significant differences in the sensitivity of investment-cash flows 
among different levels of financial constraints as measured by WW index. Regarding the cash 
flows, all the coefficients have negative and insignificant effect on financial constraints. 
(Insert Table 7 here please) 
 
4.3 Effects of Foreign acquisition on target firms’ R&D activity 
To test the effects of foreign acquisitions on the target firms’ R&D, a dummy variable of R&D 
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expenditures is used as a measurement of target firm R&D activity. A firm’s R&D expenditure 
equals to 1 if it has positive R&D expenditure at the end of year, and 0 equals otherwise. The 
dependent variable is R&D expenditure. Table 8 reports the effects of foreign acquisition on 
target firm R&D expenditure. In each specification, the coefficient of After is positive and 
significant at 1% significant level. The coefficient values are between 0.0397 and 0.0643, 
suggesting that the R&D expenditures increased by 3.97% to 6.43% following the foreign 
acquisition. Hypothesis 3 is therefore supported. The results appear consistent to the 
conclusion drawn by Vaara et al. (2012) Bertrand (2009); Bertrand and Zuniga (2006) who 
found evidence that CBM&A are positively associated with R&D and increase R&D spending 
of the target firms. The results show that CBM&A enable scale and scope economies in R&D 
efforts, reduce financial constraints by improving target firms’ access to international capital 
markets thereby increasing investment in R&D. Another plausible explanation may be that 
foreign firms engaged in cross-border acquisitions tend to have ownership advantages such as 
superior technology, and this may provide target firms with opportunities to improve the 
quality of product technology and profits through an increase of R&D activity to gain 
competitive advantage over domestic rivals (Bandick et al., 2014).  
 





4.4 Effects of Foreign acquisition on target firms’ productivity 
Table 9 reports the results of the foreign acquisitions’ effect on Chinese target firms’ labour 
productivity. Following Conyon et al. (2002), firm productivity is measured by sales per 
employee. We find the coefficient of the variable After in our regression models to be 
significant and positively related with firm productivity. The coefficient values of After 
variable range from 0.0383 to 0.0436, indicating that the foreign acquisitions increase 
Chinese target firms’ productivity by 3.8% to 4.4%.  
 
(Insert Table 9 here please) 
 
The increase in the Chinese target firm’s productivity following foreign acquisition is 
consistent with the conclusion reached in the studies of Conyon et al. (2002); Girma and Corg 
(2007) who found acquisitions to exert positive impact on the labour productivity of UK 
target firms. The results suggest that acquisitions enable the transfer of not only financial 
resources but other valuable resources like high level technology, new ideas and management 
skills from parent companies to their affiliates to improve productivity. The findings reinforce 
the view that financing constraints are an impediment to the investment, productivity and the 
growth of firm.  
4.5 Robustness Check: Target firms’ Cash holding and Financial Constraints 
In order to check the robustness of our results, we employ a full sample of Chinese inward 
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CBM&A data, three years before and after the acquisitions, to test whether Chinese firms’ 
financial constraints have been mitigated after foreign acquisitions. One way of assessing 
whether the target financial constraints are lessened by acquisitions is to observe managerial 
actions regarding the firm’s financial position (Almeida et al., 2004; Fazzari et al., 1988). 
Almeida et al. (2004) argue that value maximisation leads managers to employ financial 
policies that ensure that the most important investments continue to be financed. Managers of 
financially constrained firms therefore tend to hoard cash and hence cash holding should be 
higher (Fazzari et al., 1988). A reduction of cash holdings of target firm following an 
acquisition would suggest that the target firm’s financial constraints are lessened. Therefore 
the level of cash holding is associated with financial constraints. 
 
To test the effects of foreign acquisitions on target cash holding after acquisition, we add a 
dummy variable After which take a value of 1 after the acquisition consistent to the study of 
Erel et al. (2015). We also define the deal completion year as post-acquisition firm-year 
observations. To test this hypothesis, the following equation is estimated to predict the 
quantity of cash being held by the target firms after the acquisition: 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                  (4) 
The dependent variable is cash to total assets ratio. After is a binary variable that takes a value 
of 1 after the acquisition. We employ firm level controls and two foreign country 
macroeconomic variables that vary across specifications and are potentially related to firm’s 
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growth opportunities: cash flow, Tobin’s Q, leverage, total assets, expense to revenue ratio, 
total assets squared, GDP growth and domestic credit provided by financial sector.  
Table 10 presents the results of the cash holdings positions of the target firms after the foreign 
acquisitions of the target firms. The coefficients of After in the models 1-6 are negative and 
significantly different from zero suggesting that Chinese target firms reduce their cash 
holdings ranging between 0.68% and 0.93% after acquisition. The results support the 
hypothesis that target firms’ financial constraints are reduced following the acquisitions. The 
results confirm our earlier findings that Chinese target firms are financially constrained before 
the CBM&A, however the constraints are reduced after acquisitions. The findings are robust 
after controls. 
(Insert Table 10 here please) 
5. Conclusion 
This study examines the effects of foreign acquisitions on financial constraints, investment in 
R&D and productivity of target firms in China. While a number of studies have examined the 
consequences of CBM&A by acquiring firms from emerging countries, we know little about 
the effects of foreign acquisitions on target firms in emerging countries. Utilising a unique 
and more recent data containing pre-acquisition and post-acquisition information of Chinese 
target firms over the period of 1994-2011, we find that Chinese target firms are financially 
constrained before acquisitions. The financial constraints appear severe for private and 
foreign owned targets compared to SOE targets. Our results are robust to an alternative 
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measure of financial constraints (cash holding) and to a number of controls, including 
leverage, Tobin’s Q, expense to revenue ratio, growth GDP and domestic credit.  
 
The results suggest that, Chinese firms just like other firms in BRIC countries appear to suffer 
financial constraints due to the dominance of state-owned banks which tend to discriminate 
against private firms in credit allocation. We also find that foreign acquisitions mitigate 
financial constraints of target firms indicating that acquisitions improve target finances 
through better access to both domestic and international capital markets and the possibility of 
a reallocation of capital across divisions as pointed out by Stein (2003). The implication here 
is that despite two decades of financial reforms in China, non-SOEs still encounter 
discrimination in formal financing. The underlying theoretical reasons for financial 
constraints in emerging markets and discrimination against non-SOEs in the formal financing 
sector are due to imperfections in the market, weak institutions and poor corporate 
governance system. Financial constraints arise if there are financial frictions and weak 
institutions (Laeven, 2003) hence host country institutions matter. However, it appears that 
financial liberalisation and other reforms carried out in emerging markets to reduce financial 
frictions have not gone far enough. For example, state ownership of firms and government 
involvement in businesses appear pervasive in emerging countries. This is further 
compounded by weak institutions and poor corporate governance systems thereby 
exacerbating agency problems resulting in increased financial frictions. We suggest Chinese 
government should therefore pay more attention to the nature and scope of financial sector 
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and enterprise reforms carried out so far. More importantly, we urge more reforms to improve 
the regulatory institutions and corporate governance system to make the financial system a 
level playing field for both private sector and state enterprises. Specifically, the level of state 
ownership of banks should be reduced and private ownership of banks encouraged as private 
sector constitutes an engine of growth in all economies.  
Regarding the impact of foreign acquisitions on target firms’ R&D and productivity, our 
results suggest that acquisitions lead to increase in R&D expenditure and productivity of the 
target firms. The positive impact of foreign acquisitions on R&D investments and 
productivity may be due to the alleviation of financial constraints, enabling more human 
capital and other investments in innovative activities and improvement in target firms’ 
productivity. 
From economic policy standpoint, the results of this study raise important issue that CBM&A 
bring in the capital and other resources which are often scarce in developing countries and aid 
firms’ technological progress and productivity in the host country. The results suggest that 
senior managers in China should favour the use of CBM&A as firm strategy as market for 
firms (acquisitions) rather than market for resources appears to be an important vehicle for 
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Table 1: Measurement and Sources of Variables 
 
Variable   Definition Sources 
Firm level variables     
Total assets(TA) Log value of total assets Wind database 
Gross investment/Total assets 
(I) 
(Fixed assets-lagged fixed assets+ depreciation)/Total assets Wind database 
Cash flow/Total assets(CF) (total income+ depreciation)/Total assets Wind database 
Tobin’s Q Total market value of firm/Total asset value of firm CSMAR database 
Leverage 
(net income+ income tax expense+ financial expense + depreciation+ intangible assets amortization + long-term 
prepaid expenses)/(net income+ income tax expense+ financial expense) 
CSMAR database 
DWW A dummy variable is equal to 1 if a firm's WW value is larger than the sample median, and 0 otherwise. Wind database 
Age The number of years the firm has been listed   
Expense to revenue Log value of the ratio of firm operation expenses to revenue  
Central SOE Variable value is equal to 1 if a firm's ultimate owner is central government, and 0 otherwise. Wind database 
Local SOE Variable value is equal to 1 if a firm's ultimate owner is local government, and 0 otherwise. Wind database 
Private Variable value is equal to 1 if a firm's ultimate owner is individuals and non-government entities, and 0 otherwise. Wind database 
Foreign Variable value is equal to 1 if a firm's ultimate owner is foreign companies, and 0 otherwise. Wind database 
After A dummy variable that equals one for the years after inward M&As, and 0 otherwise.  
Productivity Log value of the ratio of a firm sales to employee at the end of year Wind database 
R&D expenditure A dummy variable equals to 1 if a firm has a positive R&D expenditure at the end of year Wind database 
Country level variables 
  
GDP growth Annual percentage growth rate of GDP in foreign countries. World Bank 
Domestic credit Common logarithm value of domestic credit provided by financial sector (% of GDP) World Bank 




                                        Table 2: Sample Characteristics 




Ownership Type Number Percent 
1994 1 0.1  Central SOE 230 25.2  
1996 1 0.1  Local SOE 326 35.7  
1997 4 0.4  Private 283 31.0  
1998 2 0.2  Foreign  75 8.2  
1999 11 1.2  Total  914 100 
2000 16 1.8  Panel C: Industry Type     
2001 14 1.5  Manufacturing industry 461 50.4  
2002 26 2.8  Real Estate Industry 112 12.3  
2003 19 2.1  Transportation, Storage and Post 76 8.3  
2004 68 7.4  Retail and Wholesale Industries 71 7.8  
2005 97 10.6  Financial Industry 46 5.0  
2006 123 13.5  Information Transmission, Computer Service and Software Industries 32 3.5  
2007 86 9.4  Power, gas and water 28 3.1  
2008 140 15.3  Mining 20 2.2  
2009 103 11.3  Conglomerate 20 2.2  
2010 93 10.2  Leasehold and Business Service 17 1.9  
2011 110 12.0  Constructions 13 1.4  
Total 914 100 Agriculture 9 1.0  
   
Water Conservancy, Environment and Public Facility Management 4 0.4  
   
Culture, Sports and Entertainment 3 0.3  
   
Scientific Research, Technology Service and Geological Prospecting 1 0.1  
   
Hoteling and Catering 1 0.1  
      Total 914 100 







              Table 3: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
TA 6332 9.586  0.741  8.164  12.227  
I 6331 0.118  0.621  -2.629  2.910  
CF 6325 0.843  0.671  0.024  4.468  
Tobin’s Q 6012 1.542  1.390  0.070  7.859  
Leverage 6121 1.375  0.704  -1.146  4.643  
Expense to 
revenue 
6300  -0.018  0.447  -1.439  12.563  
DWW 6398 0.500  0.500  0 1 
Central SOE 6398 0.201  0.401  0 1 
Local SOE 6398 0.306  0.461  0 1 
Foreign 6398 0.082  0.274  0 1 
Private 6398 0.258  0.438  0 1 
Productivity 5975 5.953  0.512  4.767  7.703  
R&D expenditure 6398 0.240  0.427  0 1 
GDP growth 5873 2.971  3.316  -5.638  9.779  
Domestic credit 5831 2.215  0.167  1.784  2.542  
After 6398 0.571 0.495 0 1 





Table 4: Investment-cash flow sensitivity of Chinese firms before foreign acquisitions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
C 0.0605 0.0925 0.0920 0.1029 
 (0.054) (0.112) (0.112) (0.112) 
CF 0.0321*** 0.0317*** 0.0306*** 0.0336*** 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Tobin’s Q 0.0049** 0.0044** 0.0047** 0.0047** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Leverage 0.0045*** 0.0044*** 0.0044*** 0.0045*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Expense to revenue -0.0491*** -0.0581*** -0.0560*** -0.0576*** 
 (0.025) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Central SOE 0.0650***    
 (0.009)    
Local SOE  0.0231***   
  (0.007)   
Private   -0.0323***  
   (0.007)  
Foreign    -0.0242** 
    (0.012) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2517 2517 2517 2517 
R2 0.169 0.150 0.153 0.148 
Notes: This table presents the empirical results of investment-cash flow sensitivity of Chinese firms 
before foreign acquisitions by OLS regression. The dependent variable is gross investment to total 
assets. The definition and sources of the other variables can be seen in Table 1. We have controlled for 
both industry and year effects in each model. The industry dummies are derived on the basis of a 
one-digit China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) code collected from WIND database. The 
standard errors are presented in parentheses. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity (*), (**) 
and (***) indicate that the coefficients are significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. We use Stata 11 for 




Table 5 Investment-cash flow sensitivity for firms partitioned by level financial 
constraints before foreign acquisitions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
C 0.0110 0.0407 0.0383 0.0484 
 (0.062) (0.110) (0.110) (0.111) 
CF 0.1250*** 0.1244*** 0.1266*** 0.1270*** 
 (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
DWW 0.0929*** 0.1027*** 0.1001*** 0.1019*** 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
DWW*CF -0.1115*** -0.1135*** -0.1160*** -0.1144*** 
 (0.017) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) 
Tobin’s Q 0.0055** 0.0052*** 0.0054*** 0.0054*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Leverage 0.0045*** 0.0044*** 0.0044*** 0.0045*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Expense to revenue -0.0430* -0.0497*** -0.0484*** -0.0496*** 
 (0.024) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Central SOE 0.0597***    
 (0.009)    
Local SOE  0.0222***   
  (0.007)   
Private   -0.0307***  
   (0.007)  
Foreign    -0.0195* 
    (0.012) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2517 2517 2517 2517 
R2 0.194 0.179 0.181 0.176 
Notes: This table presents results of investment-cash flow sensitivity of Chinese firms partitioned by 
level financial constraints before inward M&As by OLS regression. Dependent variable is gross 
investment to total assets. The definition and sources of the other variables can be seen in Table 1. We 
have controlled both industry and year effects in each model specification by adding year and industry 
dummies. The industry dummies are derived on the basis of a one-digit China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) code collected from WIND database. The standard errors are presented in 
parentheses. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. (*), (**) and (***) indicate that the 
coefficients are significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.   
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Table 6 Investment-cash flow sensitivity of Chinese firms after foreign acquisitions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
C -0.6819 -0.6998 -0.6839 1.9266 
 (0.832) (0.841) (0.834) (1.249) 
CF -0.7897 -0.7925 -0.7850 -0.6073 
 (0.564) (0.565) (0.559) (0.439) 
Tobin’s Q 0.4238 0.4238 0.4238 0.4251 
 (0.465) (0.465) (0.465) (0.465) 
Leverage 0.0102* 0.0085 0.0088 0.0108 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
Expense to revenue 0.9082 0.8199 0.8032 0.7453 
 (0.646) (0.641) (0.639) (0.633) 
Central SOE 0.6612    
 (0.427)    
Local SOE  0.4033   
  (0.267)   
Private   -0.0031  
   (0.138)  
Foreign    -2.7315 
    (1.932) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3443 3443 3443 3443 
R2 0.283 0.283 0.283 0.283 
Notes: This table presents the empirical results of investment-cash flow sensitivity of Chinese firms 
after foreign acquisitions by OLS regression. The dependent variable is gross investment to total assets. 
The definition and sources of the other variables can be seen in Table 1. We have controlled both 
industry and year effects in each model specification by adding year and industry dummies. The 
industry dummies are derived on the basis of a one-digit China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) code collected from WIND database. The standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity (*), (**) and (***) indicate that the coefficients are 





Table 7 Investment-cash flow sensitivity for firms partitioned by level financial 
constraints after foreign acquisitions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
C -0.0978 -0.1160 -0.1082 2.4023 
 (0.813) (0.817) (0.817) (1.698) 
CF -2.4885 -2.4450 -2.3991 -2.2697 
 (2.389) (2.369) (2.340) (2.267) 
DWW -0.3530 -0.2183 -0.2107 -0.4374 
 (0.961) (0.932) (0.922) (0.987) 
DWW*CF 1.7020 1.6304 1.5946 1.6778 
 (2.203) (2.176) (2.157) (2.185) 
Tobin’s Q 0.4237 0.4237 0.4237 0.4250 
 (0.465) (0.465) (0.465) (0.465) 
Leverage 0.0004 -0.0014 -0.0009 0.0014 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) 
Expense to revenue 0.9574 0.9170 0.8903 0.7656 
 (0.627) (0.624) (0.621) (0.609) 
Central SOE 0.6410    
 (0.420)    
Local SOE  0.4627   
  (0.306)   
Private   0.0375  
   (0.131)  
Foreign    -2.6475 
    (1.885) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3443 3443 3443 3443 
R2 0.283 0.283 0.283 0.283 
 
Notes: This table presents the empirical results of investment-cash flow sensitivity of Chinese firms 
partitioned by level financial constraints after foreign acquisitions by OLS regression. The dependent 
variable is gross investment to total assets. The definition and sources of the other variables can be seen 
in Table 1. We have controlled both industry and year effects in each model specification by adding 
year and industry dummies. The industry dummies are derived on the basis of a one-digit China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) code collected from WIND database. The standard errors 
are presented in parentheses. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity (*), (**) and (***) 








Table 8: The effect of foreign acquisitions on R&D expenditure of Chinese target firms 
for full sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
C -3.1039*** -3.1492*** -3.2214*** -3.7556*** 
 (0.409) (0.423) (0.429) (0.433) 
After 0.0643*** 0.0638*** 0.0519*** 0.0397*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
CF 0.0463*** 0.0463*** 0.0489*** 0.0496*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
TA 0.7232*** 0.7323*** 0.7488*** 0.7206*** 
 (0.081) (0.083) (0.084) (0.084) 
TA*TA -0.0380*** -0.0385*** -0.0393*** -0.0379*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Leverage -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0007 0.0009 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age -0.0081*** -0.0080*** -0.0084*** -0.0087*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Expense to revenue  -0.0056 -0.0036 -0.0037 
  (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
GDP growth   0.0032* 0.0098*** 
   (0.002) (0.002) 
Domestic credit    0.3018*** 
    (0.032) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6114 6096 5607 5565 
R2 0.281 0.281 0.287 0.301 
 
Notes: This table present the empirical results of foreign acquisition effects on target firm investment 
involved in inward M&As by OLS regression. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 
to 1 if a firm has positive R&D expenditure, and 0 otherwise. After is a dummy variable that equals one 
for the years after inward M&As, and 0 otherwise. The definition and sources of the other variables can 
be seen in Table 1. We have controlled both industry and year effects in each model specification by 
adding year and industry dummies. The industry dummies are derived on the basis of a one-digit China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) code collected from WIND database. The standard errors 
are presented in parentheses. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity (*), (**) and (***) 






Table 9: The effect of foreign acquisitions on productivity of Chinese target firms for full 
sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
C -2.5527** -0.6172 -0.6079 -0.5449 
 (1.009) (1.267) (1.288) (1.289) 
After 0.0398*** 0.0436*** 0.0391*** 0.0383*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
CF 0.1852*** 0.1831*** 0.1780*** 0.1789*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
TA 1.5136*** 1.1540*** 1.1336*** 1.1304*** 
 (0.199) (0.252) (0.256) (0.256) 
TA*TA -0.0648*** -0.0487*** -0.0473*** -0.0471*** 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
Leverage 0.0010 0.0010 0.0006 0.0006 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age -0.0051*** -0.0039** -0.0006 -0.0005 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Expense to revenue  -0.1842*** -0.1790*** -0.1777*** 
  (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) 
GDP growth   0.0012 0.0006 
   (0.002) (0.002) 
Domestic credit    -0.0263 
    (0.038) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5831 5828 5359 5324 
R2 0.253 0.273 0.275 0.276 
 
Notes: This table present the empirical results of foreign acquisition effects on target firm investment 
involved in inward M&As by OLS regression. The dependent variable is sales per employee. After is a 
dummy variable that equals one for the years after inward M&As, and 0 otherwise. The definition and 
sources of the other variables can be seen in Table 1. We have controlled both industry and year effects 
in each model specification by adding year and industry dummies. The industry dummies are derived 
on the basis of a one-digit China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) code collected from 
WIND database. The standard errors are presented in parentheses. Standard errors are robust to 









Table 10: The effect of foreign acquisitions on cash holdings of Chinese target firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
C 0.1621*** -0.5522** -0.5352** -0.2781 -0.3171 -0.2273 
 (0.023) (0.267) (0.268) (0.265) (0.280) (0.281) 
After -0.0093*** -0.0089*** -0.0093*** -0.0068** -0.0073** -0.0075** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
CF 0.0234*** 0.0223*** 0.0222*** 0.0217*** 0.0209*** 0.0207*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
TA -0.0091*** 0.1338** 0.1349*** 0.0924* 0.1009* 0.1061* 
 (0.002) (0.052) (0.052) (0.051) (0.054) (0.055) 
Tobin’s Q 0.0004*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TA*TA  -0.0070*** -0.0071*** -0.0055** -0.0059** -0.0062** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Leverage   -0.0009*** -0.0009*** -0.0011*** -0.0011*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Expense to 
revenue 
   -0.0632*** -0.0652*** -0.0651*** 
    (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) 
GDP 
growth 
    0.0004 -0.0010 
     (0.001) (0.001) 
Domestic 
credit 
     -0.0294*** 
      (0.010) 
Year 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observatio
ns 
5940 5940 5905 5895 5424 5383 
R2 0.0874 0.0912 0.0927 0.129 0.131 0.132 
 
Notes: This table presents the empirical results of cash holdings of Chinese firms for full sample by OLS 
regression. The dependent variable is cash to total assets ratio. The definition and sources of the other variables 
can be seen in Table 1. We have controlled both industry and year effects in each model specification by adding 
year and industry dummies. The industry dummies are derived on the basis of a one-digit China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) code collected from WIND database. The standard errors are presented in 
parentheses. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. (*), (**) and (***) indicates that the coefficients are 
significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.  
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